





LEHRSTUHL FÜR BETRIEBSWIRTSCHAFTSLEHRE PERSONAL+ORGANISATION PROF. DR. THOMAS ZWICK

# **Incentives in Organizations (Master)**

# **Hours per Week**

weekly Lecture and Tutorial

### **Exam**

Written exam at the end of the semester (60 minutes)

### Content

- 1. Principal-agent theory
- 2. Do top managers earn too much?
- 3. Performance-based payment
- 4. Implementation of performance-based payment in companies
- 5. Seniority payment
- 6. Impact of seniority payment on employment
- 7. Efficiency wages
- 8. Team incentives

# References

#### Chapter 1: Principal-agent Theory

Milgrom and Roberts (1992), Economics, Organisation and Management, London.

#### Chapter 2: Do top managers earn too much?

Mishel and Sabadish (2013), CEO Pay in 2012 was extraordinarily high, EPI Issue Brief 367, Washington DC.

Fabbri and Marin (2012), What Explains the Rise in CEO Pay in Germany? A Panel Data Analysis for 1977-2009, CeslfoWorking Paper 3757, Munich.

#### **Chapter 3: Performance-based payment -Theory**

Milgrom and Roberts (1992), Economics, Organisation and Management, London.

#### **Chapter 4: Implementation of performance-based payment**

Lazear (2000), Performance Pay and Productivity, American Economic Review90, 1346-1361.

#### **Chapter 5: Seniority payment -Theory**

Lazear (1979), Why is there mandatory retirement? Journal of Political Economy87, 1261-1284.

Hutchens (1989), Seniority, Wages and Productivity: A Turbulent Decade, Journal of Economic Perspectives 3 (4), 49-64.

#### Chapter 6: Seniority payment -Empirical evidence

Zwick (2012), Consequences of Seniority Wages on the Employment Structure, Industrial and Labor Relations Review 65 (1), 108-125.

Hutchens (1987), A Test of Lazear's Theory of Delayed Payment Contracts, Journal of Labor Economics 4, 439-457.

*Ernst, Lichtenthaler and Vogt* (retracted), The Impact of Accumulating and Reactivating Technological Experience on R&D Alliance Performance, Journal of Management Studies 48 (6), 1194-1216.

#### **Chapter 7: Efficiency wages**

Salop (1979), The model of the natural rate of unemployment, American Economic Review69, 117-125.

Becker and Stigler (1974), Law enforcement, Malfeasance, and the Compensation of Enforcers, Journal of Legal Studies III, 1-18.

# **Chapter 8: Team pay**

*Garibaldi* (2006), Personnel Economics in Imperfect Labour Markets, Oxford University Press, Chapter13.

Hjort (2014), Ethnic Divisions and Production in Firms, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1899-1946.

#### General literature:

Backes-Gellner, Lazear, Wolff (2001), Personalökonomik, Stuttgart (Schäffer Poeschel).

Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004), Labor Economics, MIT Press, Chapter 6.

Lazear, Gibbs (2009), Personnel Economics in Practice, 2nd Edition, Wiley.